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Jan Assmann
The past exists, if it can be said to exist at all, in a double form: as a sedimenta­
tion of relics, traces, and personal memories and as a social construction. This dual 
nature characterizes the personal past that is with us human beings not only as inter­
nal memory traces and external memory symbols of every sort but also as an image 
or narrative that we construe and carry with us as our autobiographical or episodic 
memory. As the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs has shown, even our auto­
biographical memory is a social construction that we build up in communication 
with others. Arguably, it is strictly personal only in its first aspect, as a sedimen­
tation or unstructured archive (Halbwachs, 1925/1985). As a social construction, 
the past conveys a kind of connective structure or diachronic identity to societies, 
groups, and individuals, both socially and temporally. Memory is what allows us 
to construe an image or narrative of the past and, by the same process, to develop 
an image and narrative of ourselves. This form of memory seems to be a specifi­
cally human faculty. Clearly, animals also possess a memory, but the link between 
memory and identity—the “autonoetic” function of memory, which provides the 
connective structure that characterizes both a person and a society—seems to be a 
specifically human characteristic based on the exclusively human faculties of sym­
bolization and communication. A human self is a diachronic identity “built of the 
stuff of time” (Luckmann, 1983, p. 69). At both the collective and the personal 
levels, human memory brings about a synthesis of time and identity, which may 
be called a diachronic identity. It is this identity that allows human beings to ori­
ent themselves personally and collectively in terms of the future, the past, or both. 
Because of our memory, we are able to think in temporal horizons far beyond our 
birth and our death.
This connection between time, identity, and memory operates at three levels: 
the inner (or individual); the social, and the cultural (see Table 1). At the inner 
level, memory is about the human neuropsychical system, the individual’s personal
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Table 1 The connection between time, identity, and memory
Level Time Identity Memory
Inner Inner, subjective time Inner self Individual
Social Social time Social self, person as carrier 
of social roles
Communicative
Cultural Historical, mythical, cultural 
time
Cultural identity Cultural
memory, which until the 1920s was the only form of memory to have been rec­
ognized as such. At the social level, memory is about communication and social 
interaction. It was Halbwachs’s great discovery that human memory depends, like 
consciousness in general, on socialization and communication and that memory 
can be analyzed as a function of social life. Memory enables us humans to live in 
groups and communities, and living in groups and communities enables us to build 
a memory (Halbwachs, 1925/1985). During those same years, psychoanalysts such 
as Sigmund Freud (1953-1974) and Carl Gustav Jung (1970-1971) were develop­
ing theories of collective memory but still adhering to the first (the inner, personal) 
level, looking for collective memory in the unconscious depths of the human psyche 
rather than in the dynamics of social life. At the cultural level, the art historian Aby 
Warburg (1925/2003) seems to have been the first scholar to treat images, that is, 
cultural objectivations, as carriers of memory (Ginzburg, 1983). His main project 
was what he called the “afterlife” (Nachleben) of classical antiquity in Western cul­
ture, and he termed this project Mnemosyne, the ancient Greek term for memory and 
the mother of the nine Muses.
As an art historian, he specialized in what he called Bildgedachtnis (iconic 
memory), but the general approach to the reception of history as a form of cul­
tural memory could be applied to every other domain of symbolic forms as well 
(Gombrich, 1981). The literary historian Ernst Robert Curtius, for example, applied 
it to language, inaugurating a new field of research that he termed Toposforschung 
(topos research; e.g., Curtius, 1948). Among these early theorists of cultural mem­
ory, Thomas Mann should be mentioned for his four Joseph novels (1933-1943), 
which are the most advanced attempt at reconstructing the cultural memory of per­
sons living in Palestine and Egypt in the Late Bronze Age. By the same token, the 
novels conjure up European cultural memory and its Jewish foundations in times of 
antisemitism (J. Assmann, 2006b). Neither Warburg nor Mann, however, used the 
term cultural memory, for it did not emerge until the late 1980s. It is, therefore, only 
within the last 20 years that the connection between time, identity, and memory in 
their three dimensions of the personal, the social, and the cultural has become more 
and more evident.
The term communicative memory has been introduced in order to delineate the 
difference between Halbwachs’s concept of collective memory and the understand­
ing of cultural memory presented in A. Assmann and J. Assmann (1989) and 
J. Assmann (1988, 1992). Cultural memory is a form of collective memory in that a
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number of people share cultural memory and in that it conveys to them a collective 
(i.e., cultural) identity. Halbwachs, however, was careful to keep his concept of col­
lective memory apart from the realm of traditions, transmissions, and transferences 
that I propose to subsume under cultural memory. I preserve Halbwachs’s distinc­
tion by breaking his concept of collective memory down into “communicative” and 
“cultural” memory but insist on treating the cultural sphere, which he excluded, 
as another form of memory. I am, therefore, not expanding or diluting Halbwachs’s 
concept in a direction that for him would have been unacceptable. Nor do I argue for 
replacing his idea of collective memory with the notion of cultural memory. Rather, 
I distinguish between the two forms as two different modi memorandi, or ways of 
remembering.
Culture as Memory
Cultural memory is an institution. It is exteriorized, objectified, and stored away 
in symbolic forms that, unlike the sounds of words or the appearance of gestures, 
are stable and situation-transcendent. They may be transferred from one situation 
to another and transmitted from one generation to another. Unlike communicative 
memory, cultural memory is disembodied. In order to function as memory, however, 
its symbolic forms must not only be preserved but also circulated and re-embodied 
in a society. The disembodied status of cultural memory is another reason why it 
was not recognized as a form of memory until recently. Memory, the argument 
runs, requires a mind. Things like the madeleine immortalized by Marcel Proust 
(1931/1982, pp. 46-47) or monuments, archives, libraries, anniversaries, feasts, 
icons, symbols, and landscapes cannot have or carry memory, for they lack a mind.
This objection, however, rests on a complete misunderstanding. Neither Proust 
nor Halbwachs nor anyone else who speaks or writes of collective memory has 
ever asserted that collective or cultural memory “exists in something that has no 
mind.” Dishes, feasts, rites, images, texts, landscapes and other things do not “have” 
a memory of their own, but they may remind their beholder, may trigger that per­
son’s memory because they carry the memories that he or she has invested them 
with. Groups do not have a memory in the way an individual does, but they may 
make themselves a memory by erecting monuments and by developing a variety of 
cultural techniques (mnemotechniques) that support memory or promote forgetting 
(A. Assmann, 2006).
Memory, which people possess as beings equipped with a human mind, exists 
solely in constant interaction not only with other human memories but also with 
outward symbols. Human memory is embodied, and it requires a brain as the mate­
rial carrier of its embodiment. In addition it is embedded, and it requires social and 
cultural frames for its embedment. Memory is not a metaphor for embedment but 
rather a metonym for physical contact between a remembering mind and a remind­
ing object. Halbwachs acknowledged social frames only, hut it seems obvious that 
human memory is also embedded in cultural frames, such as the landscape or town- 
scape in which people grew up, the texts they learned, the feasts they celebrated, the
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churches or synagogues they frequented, the music they listened to, and especially 
the stories they were told and by and in which they live. This interaction between 
a remembering mind and a reminding object is why the realm of these things and 
especially the things meant as reminders (mnemonic institutions) must be included 
in the concept of memory.
This institutional character does not apply to what Halbwachs called collective 
memory and what I propose to rename communicative memory. Communicative 
memory is noninstitutional. It is not supported by any institutions of learning, 
transmission, or interpretation, nor is it cultivated by specialists or summoned or 
celebrated on special occasions. It is not formalized and stabilized by any forms of 
material symbolization. It lives in everyday interaction and communication. For this 
very reason communicative memory is of fairly limited duration.
Change in constellations and frames brings about forgetting; the durability of 
memories depends on the durability of social bonds and “frames.” Halbwachs, in 
his work before 1941, does not seem to be concerned with the social interests and 
power structures that are active in shaping and framing individual memories. In his 
last work on collective memory, however, he shows a keen awareness of institution 
and power (Halbwachs, 1941). That book, written and published during the German 
occupation of Paris, deals with the transformation of Palestine into a site of Christian 
memory by the erection of all sorts of memorials after the adoption of Christianity 
as the state religion by the Roman empire. In this work Halbwachs crosses the line 
that he himself drew between memoire and tradition and shows to what degree this 
kind of official memory depends on theological dogma and how much it is formed 
by the power structure of the church.
Time Frames
Jan Vansina, an anthropologist who worked with oral societies in Africa, devoted 
an important study to the form in which they represent the past (Vansina, 1985). 
He observed a tripartite structure. The recent past, which looms large in interac­
tive communication, gradually recedes into the background. Information becomes 
increasingly scarce and vague the further one moves into the past. According to 
Vansina, this knowledge of affairs that are told and discussed in everyday commu­
nication has a limited depth in time, not reaching beyond three generations. A more 
remote past is marked by either a total gap of information or one or two names 
remembered only with great hesitation. For the most remote past, however, there is 
again a profusion of information dealing with traditions surrounding the origin of 
the world and the early history of the tribe. This information is not committed to 
everyday communication; it is highly formalized and institutionalized. It exists as 
narratives, songs, dances, rituals, masks, and symbols. Specialists such as narrators, 
bards, and mask carvers are organized in guilds and must undergo long periods of 
initiation, instruction, and examination. Moreover, actualization of the most remote 
past requires certain occasions, such the gathering of the community for some cel­
ebration or other. This actualization is what I propose to call “cultural memory.”
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In oral societies, as Vansina shows, the informal generational memory referring to 
the recent past is separated from the formal cultural memory that refers to the remote 
past. Because this gap shifts with the succession of generations, Vansina calls it the 
“floating gap” (pp. 23-24). Vansina sums up by stating that historical consciousness 
operates at only two levels: time of origins and recent past.
Vansina’s (1985) floating gap illustrates the difference between social (com­
municative) and cultural frames of memory. The communicative memory contains 
memories of what Vansina refers to as the recent past. They are the ones that an indi­
vidual shares with his or her contemporaries. They are what Halbwachs understood 
by collective memory and are the object of oral history, that branch of historical 
research drawing not on the usual written sources of historiography but exclusively 
on memories elicited in oral interviews. All studies in oral history confirm that, 
even in literate societies, living memory goes back no further than 80 years, after 
which point—separated by the floating gap—come the dates from schoolbooks and 
monuments (rather than myths of origin) (Niethammer, 1985).
Cultural memory rests on fixed points in the past. Even in cultural memory, 
the past is not preserved as such but rather is galvanized in symbols, for they are 
represented in oral myths, conveyed in writings, and performed in feasts as they 
continually illuminate a changing present. In the context of cultural memory, the 
distinction between myth and history vanishes. What counts is not the past as it is 
investigated and reconstructed by archaeologists and historians but only the past as 
it is remembered. It is the temporal horizon of cultural memory that is important. 
The cultural memory of the people who share it extends into the past only as far as 
the past can be reclaimed as “theirs.” For that reason I refer to this form of historical 
consciousness as “memory,” not just as knowledge about the past. Whereas knowl­
edge has no form and is endlessly cumulative, memory involves forgetting. It is 
only by forgetting what lies outside the horizon of the relevant that it supports iden­
tity. Nietzsche (1874/1960) circumscribed this function by notions such as “plastic 
power” and “horizon” (p. 213), obviously intending to convey what the term identity 
is generally accepted to mean now.
Institutions, Carriers
The difference between communicative and cultural memory expresses itself also in 
the social dimension, in the structure of participation. The participation of a group 
in communicative memory is diffuse. Some people know more, some less, and the 
memories of the old go farther back than those of the young. However, there are no 
specialists in informal, communicative memory. The knowledge communicated in 
everyday interaction has been acquired by the participants along with language and 
social competence. By contrast, the participation of a group in cultural memory is 
always highly differentiated, especially in oral and egalitarian societies. The preser­
vation of the group’s cultural memory was originally the task of the poets. Even 
today, the African griots (storytellers) fulfill this function of guardians of cultural 
memory.
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Cultural memory always has its specialists. These carriers of memory are known 
under a rich assortment of names, such as shamans, bards, griots, priests, teachers, 
artists, clerks, scholars, mandarins, rabbis, and mullahs. In oral societies, the degree 
of their specialization depends on the magnitude of the demands on their memory. 
The highest rank is accorded verbatim transmission. This task requires use of the 
human memory as a “data base” in a sense approaching the use of writing. A fixed 
text is verbally “written” into the highly specialized and trained memory of these 
specialists. The approach typically applies when ritual knowledge is at stake and 
when a ritual must strictly follow a “script,” even if that script is not laid down 
in writing. The Rgveda is the foremost example of a codification of ritual memory 
rooted solely in oral tradition. The social rank of the specialists in ritual corresponds 
to the magnitude of this task. They are known as the Brahmins, who constitute 
their society’s highest caste. It is even higher than the aristocratic class of warriors 
(kshatriya), to which the rulers belong. In traditional Rwanda, the full text of all 18 
royal rituals had to be memorized by specialists who ranked as the highest notables 
of the kingdom. Error was punishable by death. Those three notables partook even 
in the divinity of the ruler (Borgeaud, 1988, p. 13).
Rituals are therefore the context in which the oldest systems of memorization 
or mnemotechniques arose, with or without the help of notation systems like knot­
ted chords, churingas, and other forms of prewriting. It is interesting to see how 
differently various religions have behaved toward writing after the development of 
full-fledged systems for that new cultural technique. In the Indo-European tradi­
tions, from the Indian Brahmins to the Celtic Druids, writing is generally distrusted 
and shunned. Memory is held to be the far more trustworthy medium for handing 
down the religious (i.e., ritual) knowledge to later generations. The reason normally 
given for this preference is that too many mistakes may creep into a text by copying. 
The true reason, however, seems to be that writing always implies the danger of dis­
semination, the divulgence of a secret tradition to the profane and uninitiated. This 
distrust of writing was still very prominent in Plato’s works (Plato, trans. 1901a, 
1901b). In the Semitic traditions such as those of Mesopotamia, Israel, and Egypt, 
on the other hand, writing is eagerly grasped as an ideal medium for codifying and 
transmitting the sacred traditions, especially ritual scripts and recitations.
Even where the sacred tradition is committed to writing, memorization plays the 
central role. In ancient Egypt, a typical temple library contained no more books 
than may be known by heart by the specialists. Clement of Alexandria gives a 
vivid description of such a library, including the books that formed the stock of 
an Egyptian temple library—all written by Thot-Hermes himself. The hierarchical 
structure of the priesthood, with its five different ranks, reflected the size and impor­
tance of the literature to be memorized. The priests were not expected to read and 
learn all of the books but to specialize in certain genres corresponding to their rank 
and office.
In describing a solemn procession of these priests, Clement showed both the 
hierarchy of the priesthood and the structure of their library (Clemens Alex., Strom. 
VI. Cap. IV, §§35.1-37; see G. Fowden, 1993, pp. 58-59).1 It was the books of the 
stolistes that served as a codification of ritual memory proper, complemented by
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what Clement calls “education.” The books of the high priest, on the other hand, 
are said to have contained literature on the laws, the gods, and priestly education. 
The library was thus divided into normative knowledge, which ranks highest; ritual 
knowledge, which comes as a close second; and general knowledge about astron­
omy, geography, poetry, biography, and medicine, all of which occupies the lowest 
rung in this canon of indispensable literature.
[Forty-two], Clement summarizes, is the number of the “absolutely necessary” [party 
anankaiai] books of Hermes. Of those, 36 are learned by heart by the priests; these books 
contain the entire philosophy of the Egyptians. The remaining six books are learned by the 
pastophoroi. They deal with medicine, that is, with anatomy, with diseases, with the bod­
ily members and organs, with drogues [drugs], with ophthalmology and with gynaecology.
(J. Assmann, 2001, pp. 88-89)
There is, however, yet another sense in which the participation in cultural memory 
may be structured in a society: that of restricted knowledge, of secrecy and esoteri- 
cism. Every traditional society has areas of restricted knowledge whose boundaries 
are not defined merely by the different capacities of human memory and understand­
ing but also by issues of access and initiation. In Judaism, for example, general 
participation is required in the Torah, which every male member of the group is 
supposed to know by heart. Specialized participation characterizes the world of 
Talmudic and medieval commentaries, codices, and Midrash, a vast body of litera­
ture that only specialists can master. Secrecy, however, shrouds the esoteric world 
of kabbala, to which only select adepts are admitted (and even then only after they 
have reached 40 years of age).
The participation structure of cultural memory has an inherent tendency to 
elitism; it is never strictly egalitarian. Some individuals have to prove their degree 
of admittance by formal exams, as in traditional China; or by the mastery of linguis­
tic registers, as in England; or of the treasury of German quotations (Citatenschatz 
des deutschen Volkes), as in nineteenth-century Germany. Others remain systemati­
cally excluded from this “distinguished” knowledge, such as the women in ancient 
Greece, traditional China, and Orthodox Judaism or the lower classes in the heyday 
of the German educated middle class (Bildungsbiirgertum).
As for the media of cultural memory, there is a more or less pronounced ten­
dency toward a form of intracultural diglossia, corresponding to the distinction 
between one “great tradition” and several “little traditions” as proposed by Redfield 
(1956, passim). Until the creation of Iwrith (modern Hebrew), the Jews always lived 
in a situation of diglossia, for their “Great Tradition” was written in Hebrew and 
their everyday communication took place in vernacular languages such as Yiddish, 
Ladino, or the various languages of their host countries. To a similar or lesser degree, 
this phenomenon is typical of virtually all traditional societies, be it in the form of 
two different (though related) languages such as Hindu and Sanscrit or Italian and 
Latin or of two different linguistic varieties such as Qur’anic and vernacular Arabic 
or classical and modem Chinese. In modern societies this binary structure tends to 
diversify into additional linguistic varieties as cultural media such as film, broad­
casting, and television multiply. The clear-cut binary structure of Table 2 therefore 
does not do full justice to the modern situation.
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Table 2 Communicative and cultural memory: areas of difference
Forms,
dimensions Communicative memory Cultural memory
Content History in the frame of 
autobiographical memory, recent 
past
Mythical history, events in the 
mythical (in illo tempore) or 
historical past
Forms Informal traditions and genres of 
everyday communication
High degree of formation, 
ceremonial communication; 
Rituals, feasts
Media Living, embodied memory, 
communication in vernacular 
language
Mediated in texts, icons, dances, 
rituals, and performances of 
various kinds; “classical” or 
otherwise formalized language(s)
Time structure 80-100 years, a moving horizon of 
3^t interacting generations
Absolute past, mythical primordial 
time, “3,000 years”
Participation
structure
Diffuse Specialized carriers of memory, 
hierarchically structured
Transitions and transformations account for the dynamics of cultural memory. 
Two typical directions have a structural significance and should at least briefly be 
mentioned in this context. One is the transition from autobiographical and commu­
nicative memory to cultural memory. The other direction concerns, within cultural 
memory, the move from the rear stage to the forefront, from the periphery to the 
center, from latency or potentiality to manifestation or actualization and vice-versa. 
These shifts presuppose structural boundaries to be crossed: the boundary between 
embodied and mediated forms of memory, and the boundary between what 1 propose 
to call “working” and “storage memories” or “canon” and “archive” (A. Assmann, 
1999, pp. 130-145). Western society is living through a period of transition from 
communicative to cultural memory. The main problem is how to preserve the per­
sonal memories of holocaust survivors and other eye witnesses of the catastrophes 
that occurred in the context of World War II and how to transform them into 
durable forms of cultural memory that may be transmitted to later generations. The 
Biblical book of Deuteronomy offers a striking parallel. The problem with which 
Deuteronomy is concerned is how to preserve the memory of the generation who 
had witnessed the Exodus from Egypt and the revelation of the Law and turn it 
into cultural memory that can be handed down to an infinite number of future gen­
erations of Israelites. The aim of Deuteronomy is to teach what to remember and 
how to remember, that is, both the lesson that must never be forgotten and the 
mnemotechnique that ensures its continuous transmission. Moses outlines a full- 
fledged mnemotechnique of individual and collective remembering (J. Assmann, 
1992, pp. 215-228).
The book of Deuteronomy is the foundation text of a religion based on a covenant 
between one single god and a chosen people. In this new religion, memory is to play 
the central role. It deals with a revolutionary change of cultural memory. Normally, 
cultural memory is not instituted this way; it accumulates and changes in the course
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of centuries instead. The mnemotechnique of Deuteronomy follows and elaborates 
a model that belongs more to political than to cultural memory (for this distinction 
see A. Assmann, 2006). Political memory is highly normative, prescribing what, in 
the interest of forming and belonging to a political identity, must never be forgotten. 
Deuteronomy closely corresponds to this concept. The model it describes is based 
on a ritual that Esarhaddon of Assyria had introduced to ensure that the vassals of his 
empire remembered their allegiance. First, they had to travel to Nineveh in order to 
swear an oath of loyalty to Esarhaddon and his designated successor Ashurbanipal. 
Then, so as not to forget this oath once they had returned to their home cities, they 
had to perform an annual ritual to refresh their memory. This ritual was dedicated 
to the goddess Ishtar of Arbela.
Water from a sarsaru-jar, she [Ishtar of Arbela] let them drink,
a goblet of 1 Seah [about 6 1, or 1 \ U.S. gallons] she filled with water from the sarsaru-jar 
and presented it to them],] saying:
In your hearts you will speak thus: Ishtar, a narrow one is she! [i.e., Ishtar is only a local 
deity, ignorant of what is going on far off]
Thus: You will return to your cities and will eat bread in your districts, and will forget these 
contractual stipulations.
Thus: You will drink from this water and again remember and observe these contractual 
stipulations which I set up concerning Esarhaddon. (J. Assmann, 2006a, p. 10)
From this ritual of memory and certainly many similar ones that were to be repeated 
periodically, Deuteronomy develops an entire culture of remembrance and a life 
form that came to be understood as “religion” and then became the model for later 
world religions such as Christianity and Islam. This new type of religion comprises 
much more than just cult. It extends to every aspect of life and focuses especially on 
justice and morals. It does not develop from pagan cults but rather from the political 
system it means to supersede as a form of liberation, emancipation, and enlighten­
ment. It therefore represents a totally new form of both religion and sociopolitical 
organization, which rests primarily on memory.
Again the connection between memory and society surfaces. Memory, as stated 
at the beginning of this chapter, enables us human beings to live in groups and com­
munities, and living in groups and communities enables us to build a memory. This 
connection between memory and belonging is not only a matter of self-regulating 
or “autopoietic” evolution, as Halbwachs suggests. It is also a matter of political 
foundation or fabrication. Both remembering and belonging have normative aspects. 
If you want to belong, you must remember: Zakhor—remember—is the Jewish 
imperative (Yerushalmi, 1982).
The Assyrian mnemotechnique, too, was meant as the foundation of a political 
memory where memory is an obligation. If you wanted to belong to the Assyrian 
empire and be safe from its political violence, you had to remember the loyalty you 
had sworn. If you forgot, you would be punished and expelled. But in the ancient 
Assyrian context the memory was still purely ritual; whereas the Deuteronomic 
mnemotechnique relies primarily on written and oral language.
As a form of memory, ritual is based on repetition. Each performance must fol­
low a fixed model as closely as possible in order to make the actual performance
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resemble the previous ones in every respect. The flow of time is brought into a 
pattern that combines the irreversible and the reversible, the passing time and the 
returning time. Human life and social institutions are thereby rescued from just 
passing away, decaying, and vanishing; they are integrated into the natural cycles 
of regeneration. Repetition is a form of preservation, of memory.
The decisive difference between ritual memory and the Torah, for example, is 
the fact that the former is known only to specialists who have to learn it by heart, 
whereas the latter is taught to everybody, and every male member of the commu­
nity is expected to know it by heart. If a civilization following the ritual model 
intends public circulation and general communication of the cultural memory stored 
in specialized memories, then it is during feasts that the broad public is admitted to 
the performance of rituals and the recitation of the sacred texts. This difference in 
participation is salient in a passage of Josephus’s pamphlet Contra Apionem:
Can any government be more holy than this? or any Religion better adapted to the nature 
of the Deity? Where, in any place but in this, are the whole People, by the special diligence 
of the Priests, to whom the care of public instruction is committed, accurately taught the 
principles of true piety? So that the body-politic seems, as it were, one great Assembly, 
constantly kept together, for the celebration of some sacred Mysteries. For those things 
which the Gentiles keep up for a few days only, that is, during those solemnities they call 
Mysteries and Initiations, we, with vast delight, and a plenitude of knowledge, which admits 
of no error, fully enjoy, and perpetually contemplate through the whole course of our lives. 
(Flavius Josephus, trans. 1738, Chapter 22; see also Flavius Josephus, trans. 1901/1993, 
pp. 177-178)
The “pagan” religions, despite their extensive use of memorization and even writing, 
still relied on ritual continuity. Rituals and texts were solutions to the problem of 
how to make the transient permanent and, hence, how to establish continuity. The 
same issue confronts memory, and in that sense rituals and texts may be seen as 
media of memory. Rituals secure the transient by iteration; texts, by duration.
Textual continuity is achieved only when there are institutions of learning and 
exegesis that keep the ancient texts alive and semantically transparent. Because the 
texts themselves must not be altered, exegesis and commentary are the only ways to 
preserve the meaning of the texts while also adapting it to a changing world. All new 
religions since antiquity develop canons of sacred scripture and commentaries that 
translate the canonical texts into changing realities and conditions of understanding. 
Most of these religions are monotheistic and most are in antagonistic opposition to 
older traditions and other religions, which they reject as paganism. The circle of 
these faiths include Judaism and the Tanakh, Christianity and the Christian Bible, 
Islam and the Qur’an, Buddhism and the Pali-Canon, Jainism and the Jaina-Canon, 
the Sikh religion and the Adi Granth, Daoism, and Confucianism, extending down 
to the Mormons and the Book of Mormon. The strong alliance between religions of 
this new type—the world religions—and the formation of canons and commentaries 
underscores the connection between memory and identity. The transition from ritual 
to textual continuity means a complete reorganization of cultural memory in the 
same way as the transition from the ethnically and culturally determined religions of 
the ancient world to the new type of transcultural and transnational world religions
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meant a totally new construction of identity. The canon, in a way, functioned as a 
new transethnic homeland and as a new transcultural formation and education.
Western cultural memory, however, is informed not only by the Biblical canon 
but also by a parallel canon of Greek and Latin literature. It was the outstand­
ing achievement of Irish monks and Byzantine scholars, people working on the 
periphery of the ancient world, to have copied and rescued alongside with religious 
literature a considerable part of the pagan literature of classical antiquity. Detailed 
discussion of this second canon is beyond the scope of this *chapter, but it should at 
least be mentioned because it represents a kind of parallel project. At about the same 
time as the final redaction of the Biblical canon, the Alexandrian philologists started 
to collect and select the literature of ancient Greece, compiling lists of those works 
and authors that deserved to be edited and annotated (hoi prattomenoi). These tracts 
and authors were the ones Aulus Gellius classified as “classici,” alluding to the first 
class of Roman taxpayers as a metaphor for the most important material and writers. 
Canonization and classicism are typical phenomena in the organization of a cultural 
memory, not only in the West but wherever writing has a fundamental role. Not only 
does Western tradition have several eras and movements of a return to antiquity, of 
classicisms such as the Renaissance in Italy, the seventeenth century in France, the 
“Augustan Age” in England, and the decades around 1790 in Germany. It also has 
the formation of “Golden Ages” to which later epochs have recourse to, such as the 
Elizabethan Age in England and the time of Louis XIV in France; of Schiller and 
Goethe in Weimar; and of Mozart, Haydn, and Beethoven in Vienna. The case of 
music is especially revealing of the necessity to create a Golden Age, for there is no 
possibility of returning to antiquity in that field (Vosskamp, 1993).
The distinction between the classical and the sacred canons lies in the fact that 
the sacred canon is closed and can be amplified or modified only by commentaries, 
whereas the classical canon is open because every age—including antiquity—may 
become an object of recourse, recycling, and reference for another and because the 
canon of “classics” changes and rearranges itself around a central stock of unques­
tionable works with every new work that is admitted to the canon. One cannot deny, 
however, that even the classical canon has a certain religious character. It seems evi­
dent that art, philosophy, and religion have common roots and that these roots lie in 
nothing other than cultural memory.
Note
1. Clement invites the reader to imagine a small group of people solemnly filing from a sacred 
building in ascending order of rank. The singer comes first. He carries a musical emblem as a 
sign. He is supposed to have learned by heart two books of Hermes, one containing hymns to 
the gods and the other a biography of the reigning king. Next comes the horoscopos, carrying a 
palm branch and an astrological emblem. He is to know by heart the four astrological books of 
Hermes, one dealing with the order of darkness, one with the planets, one with the encounters 
and appearances of the sun and moon, and the last one with the risings (of the decan stars). 
Then the hierogrammateus comes forth, carrying a feather on his head and a book and the 
equipment of a scribe in his hands. Unlike the horoscopes, whose astrological knowledge refers
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to the order of time, the hierogrammateus is the specialist for the order of space. He has to 
know the so-called hieroglyphical books dealing with cosmography and geography, with the 
constellations of the sun, the moon and the five planets, the soil of Egypt and the nature of 
the Nile, the structure and equipment of the temples, the grounds allotted to the temples, the 
measurements, and the objects used in the temples. These three priests deal only with the 
context of ritual; the following two superior ranks address its content. The first of them to 
emerge is the stolistes whose sign is a stola and whose competence concerns ten books dealing 
with education, cult, and sacrifice. Clement’s stolistes is the “lector priest.” He appears in the 
earliest representations of Egyptian rituals, wearing a scarf across his breast and bearing in his 
hands a scroll from which he reads aloud the ritual recitations. His Egyptian title is hrj-h3b, 
literally “scroll bearer,” and he is both the embodiment of ritual memory and the master in 
the art of writing. Last comes the prophetes, or high priest, carrying a situla with water and 
followed by attendants bearing a processional plate with breads. As the chief of the temple 
priesthood, he has learned the ten “hieratic” books concerning the laws, the gods, and all about 
priestly education. Holding the highest priestly rank, he acts as the representative of the king. 
His Egyptian title, “servant of the god” or “highest servant of the god,” has nothing to do with 
prophecy.
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